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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In McNabb v. United States,' the Supreme Court claimed-for the first time in its history-the prerogative of "establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" in the exercise of "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts." Since then,
the Court has used this self-declared oversight power on numerous occasions and for a wide variety of purposes, but it has never
adequately explained either the provenance or the scope of this
type of judicial authority. Lower federal courts have followed
suit, on the largely unexamined assumption that they too are
endowed with supervisory authority, and have employed that
power even more freely than has the Supreme Court.
From the perspective of the executive branch, the most critical aspect of supervisory power has been its use by the judiciary
to adopt exclusionary rules of evidence and to recognize defenses
unknown to the common law in an effort to deter misconduct on
the part of federal investigators. The use of supervisory power
by the judicial branch to control law enforcement activities by
the executive branch is troubling for several reasons, not the
least of which is that there appears to be no sound constitutional
or other legal basis for this practice. As a result, such uses of
supervisory power violate the fundamental principle of separation of powers. They also disregard the will of Congress and ultimately frustrate the search for truth in criminal investigations
and prosecutions.
A. Overview Of The Supervisory Power Doctrine
The supervisory power doctrine, which originated in McNabb,
holds that, in addition to their customary appellate authority,
reviewing courts in the federal system possess a general oversight authority with respect to the administration of justice in
the lower federal courts and may, in the exercise of that power,
formulate procedural and evidentiary rules that are more stringent than those required by the Constitution or federal statutes.
Proponents of the supervisory power doctrine argue that supervisory power stems from the inherent rulemaking authority
of the courts under article III of the Constitution. Yet, neither
1.

318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943).
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history nor logic provides much support for the proposition that
rulemaking authority is an inherent aspect of article III judicial
power. The historical evidence does not demonstrate that the
Framers intended to endow the federal courts with the relatively
open-ended rulemaking powers of English common law tribunals. Moreover, the legitimate concept of inherent judicial authority seems quite narrow-encompassing only such power as is
indispensable to the effective functioning of the federal courts.
It does not appear to include authority to formulate typical rules
of procedure and evidence; it has never been essential that the
courts create such rules, because legitimate sources of constitutionally acceptable rules have always existed. Apart from questions as to its propriety, supervisory power is limited-at least
theoretically-by the constitutional principles of federalism and
separation of powers, and by the ultimate authority of Congress
to prescribe governing rules of procedure and evidence. But
courts have not always observed these limitations. Attracted by
the versatility and flexibility of supervisory power in serving judicial purposes, they have employed it in a broad spectrum of
contexts.
Most supervisory power decisions have been limited to the
federal system and have dealt with matters of traditional concern to the judiciary. Arguably, these decisions are within the
judiciary's special competence-jury selection, acceptance of
guilty pleas, and permissible cross-examination, for example. In
these and similar areas, the courts have employed supervisory
power to establish rules of procedure aimed at promoting the
fairness and reliability of the truthfinding process in criminal
trials. In cases involving government "misconduct," however,
courts have been motivated by other considerations-principally
a desire to protect "judicial integrity" and deter resort to "improper" law enforcement methods. In those cases, they have
used supervisory power to exclude probative and trustworthy evidence, or to dismiss charges, in derogation of their truthfinding
function. Although most of these cases have involved the conduct of federal officers, the Court has apparently used supervisory power to impose nonconstitutional requirements on state
officers in search and seizure and interrogation cases as well.
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The Use Of Supervisory Power To Control Law
Enforcement Activities

Although the Supreme Court has occasionally disavowed an
intention to use supervisory power as an indirect method of con-

trolling law enforcement activities, these disclaimers are belied
by its rulings excluding relevant and reliable evidence, and recognizing the propriety of dismissing charges, in order to deter
investigative misconduct. The Court's fourth amendment exclusionary rule decisions are unmistakable examples of the use of
supervisory power for this purpose, as are its rulings suppressing
confessions obtained during unlawful delays in arraignment.
Other, less obvious, examples are cases in which it has required
exclusion of confessions secured in violation of the Massiah
"right to counsel" or the Miranda rules for custodial interrogation, and those in which it has approved the dismissal of indictments because of entrapment or similar "overzealous" law enforcement conduct. In each of these types of cases, deterrence
has clearly been the Court's objective, but the supervisory power
nature of its ruling has not been so clear. Nevertheless, because
these decisions are not mandated by any constitutional or statutory requirement, there is no alternative but to regard them as
applications of what the Court believes to be its supervisory
authority.
C.

Objections To The Use Of Supervisory Power To Control
Law Enforcement Activities

The use of supervisory power to control the law enforcement
activities of the executive branch is not supported by theoretical
justifications for the existence of this type of judicial authority
and disregards explicit limitations that Congress has placed on
the power of the courts.
Several arguments have been offered to support the proposition that the judiciary has supervisory authority over the administration of justice in the federal courts. Thus, it has been suggested that supervisory power rulings reflect the courts' inherent
authority to adopt procedural and evidentiary rules for the conduct of their business, to fashion remedies for constitutional or
statutory violations, to preserve their own integrity, to check improper conduct by the executive branch, and to create federal
common law. None of these theories provides a sound legal basis
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for decisions that attempt to control the conduct of federal investigators, be that conduct lawful or unlawful.
In situations in which federal investigators violate no constitutional or statutory provision, such as cases involving claims of
entrapment or similar "misconduct," the use of supervisory
power does not serve to regulate the manner in which the courts
carry out their business, in the critical sense of enhancing the
efficiency and reliability of the judicial process. And, since no
illegality is involved, supervisory power decisions do not function to remedy violations of recognized rights, or to protect the
integrity of the courts, or to check unlawful acts by the executive branch. Moreover, since the defenses of entrapment and
government "misconduct" were unknown to the common law,
the use of supervisory power in these cases does not reflect legitimate judicial recognition of common law doctrine. All it does is
violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers by
impairing the ability of the executive branch to use constitutionally and statutorily permissible methods in enforcing the laws
enacted by the legislative branch.
In cases involving unlawful investigative conduct, the use of
supervisory power appears to be equally illegitimate. The search
and seizure exclusionary rule and the exclusionary rules of McNabb, Mallory, Massiah, and Miranda are inconsistent with the
common law's treatment of illegally obtained evidence and are
not the sorts of procedural rules that are arguably within the
inherent authority of the judiciary to promulgate for the purpose of facilitating the work of the courts or enhancing the
truthfinding process. Furthermore, they are not needed to preserve the integrity of the courts, and they do not, and are not
intended to, function in a truly remedial fashion. Moreover, even
if the courts have inherent authority to act to prevent unlawful
police conduct, they may not employ that power to exclude evidence unless the Constitution requires or Congress permits them
to do so. But the Constitution generally does not require exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, and Congress has severely
restricted the authority of the courts to suppress such evidence.
The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 plainly undercut the judiciary's authority to exclude voluntary confessions obtained by
noncompliance with the McNabb, Mallory, and Miranda rules,
and it arguably did the same with respect to incriminating statements produced by violating the expanded "right to counsel"
recognized in the Massiah line of cases. Additional and conclusive evidence of the courts' lack of supervisory power to suppress
such evidence is Rule 402 of the. Federal Rules of Evidence,
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which requires the admission of all relevant evidence unless exclusion is required by the Constitution, a federal statute, the
Rules of Evidence, or another rule promulgated pursuant to
statutory authority.
Finally, it appears that Rule 402 may have also removed the
courts' supervisory authority to continue to apply the search and
seizure exclusionary rule. The only exception to Rule 402 that
supports exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment is Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the exclusionary mandate of that rule
seems to have limited practical significance and appears to be
ripe for reconsideration by Congress in light of the fact that the
theory on which it is premised-that the Constitution requires
suppression of evidence obtained by violating the fourth amendment-has been discredited and abandoned.
D. Proposals For Reform And Recommended Implementing
Strategies
The federal courts have clearly overstepped the bounds of supervisory authority in cases affecting the conduct of both federal
and state law enforcement officials. In general, the judicial
branch must be persuaded to display greater respect for the constitutional and statutory limitations on its power to supervise
the administration of criminal justice in federal and state courts.
More specifically, efforts should be made to reverse judicial decisions employing supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment or the rules of Massiah
and Miranda, as well as to limit the use of supervisory power to
dismiss charges on grounds of entrapment, and to preclude its
use in response to "official misconduct" not amounting to entrapment. It is recommended that, to achieve these goals, the
Department of Justice undertake a coordinated program of litigative, legislative, administrative, and educational initiatives, as
follows:
1. The Department should take full advantage of litigative opportunities in the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to argue that the judiciary has no authority to supervise federal law
enforcement conduct unless the Constitution or Congress gives
it power to do so.
2. The Department should pursue legislation totally abolishing
the search and seizure exclusionary rule. It should also consider
proposing an amendment to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
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Criminal Procedure and attempting to secure codification or
elimination of the current entrapment defense, as well as statutory delineation of the scope of judicial supervisory authority.
3. The Department should take administrative steps to improve judicial and public perceptions of its ability and willingness to ensure lawful conduct on the part of federal
investigators.
4. The Department should expand the public debate on impediments to the truthfinding process in criminal cases by initiating discussions of the courts' lack of authority to impose rules
that exclude relevant and reliable evidence, or to recognize defenses based on investigative conduct that does not violate constitutional or statutory standards.
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THE JUDICIARY'S USE OF
SUPERVISORY POWER TO
CONTROL FEDERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

For more than forty years, reviewing courts in the federal system have been wielding a self-declared supervisory power over

the administration of criminal justice in the lower federal courts.
One of the principal purposes for which they have exerted this
purported oversight authority has been to prevent misconduct
on the part of federal law enforcement officers by requiring the
suppression of evidence and the dismissal of indictments. These
efforts by the judicial branch to control the law enforcement activities of the executive branch are troubling in a number of respects. Not only are they devoid of any sound constitutional or
other legal basis, they violate the fundamental principle of separation of powers, they disregard the will of Congress, and they
frustrate the search for truth in criminal investigations and
prosecutions.
This Report' examines the doctrine of supervisory power, primarily as it relates to the conduct of federal law enforcement
activities.8 Part I, an overview of the supervisory power doctrine,
discusses the dubious legitimacy of supervisory power, examines
briefly the origins of the supervisory power doctrine, and describes the general nature and scope of this form of judicial authority. Part II reviews the supervisory power decisions of the
Supreme Court and lower courts in cases involving misconduct
by federal law enforcement officials. This portion of the Report
concludes that the Supreme Court has apparently moderated its
2.

The study upon which this Report is based is part of the Office of Legal Policy's

"Truth in Criminal Justice Project"-an ongoing effort to identify features of contemporary procedure that unduly hinder the search for truth in criminal cases and to develop
specific recommendations for overcoming those impediments.
3. As used in this Report, the term "federal law enforcement activities" refers to the
investigative conduct of federal officers but does not include conduct in the course of
grand jury investigations. Because of the special relationships between courts, prosecutors, and grand juries, courts may have greater latitude to control the behavior of prosecutors before the grand jury than they do to regulate other kinds of investigative
activity.
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views of the appropriate application of supervisory power in this
context, but lower federal courts generally have not been so circumspect. Part III presents a critical analysis of the supervisory
power doctrine, focused on the inadequacy of the various theoretical justifications that have been advanced for the use of supervisory power to control federal law enforcement activities,
and on the constitutional, statutory, and other considerations
that limit its use for this purpose. The discussion concludes that
there appears to be no sound legal basis for the use of supervisory authority by federal courts to establish nonconstitutional
and nonstatutory standards to control the law enforcement efforts of the executive branch. Part IV outlines various approaches that might be taken to restore judicial respect for constitutional and statutory limitations on the exercise of
supervisory power in this context. Specific recommendations for
action are set forth in the Conclusion.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER DOCTRINE

A.

Supervisory Power Generally

Simply stated, the supervisory power doctrine holds that: (1)
in addition to their customary appellate authority, reviewing
courts in the federal system possess a general oversight authority with respect to the administration of justice in the lower federal courts; and, (2) in the exercise of this authority, the courts
may formulate-on a case-by-case basis-rules of procedure and
evidence more stringent than those required by the Constitution
or laws of the United States.4
4. See generally Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433 (1984); Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
181 (1965); Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, 27 VILL. L. REV. 506 (1981-82); Note, Supervisory Power in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 642 (1978) [hereinafter CORNELL Note]; Note,
The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEo. L.J. 1050 (1965)
[hereinafter GEORGETOWN Note]; Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963) [hereinafter HARVARD Note]; Note, A Separation of Powers
Approach to the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 427 (1982)
[hereinafter STANFORD Note]; Comment, Exclusion of Evidence Under the Supervisory
Power: United States v. Payner, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 382 (1981) [hereinafter CORNELL
Comment]; Comment, Judicially Required Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy:
An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 595
(1977) [hereinafter NORTHWESTERN Comment].
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There has been much confusion regarding the source, nature,
and scope of supervisory power. The courts have never adequately explained either the provenance or the scope of their supervisory authority. Nor have they fully acknowledged inherent
limitations on its exercise. Instead, beguiled by the many attractive qualities of supervisory power, and without pausing to examine questions of legitimacy too closely, they have employed it
to implement a wide variety of judicial policy preferences.8 The
most conspicuous applications of supervisory power-and those
that have caused the most concern-have occurred in the criminal rather than in the civil law context. One reason for concern
is that, while a few exercises of supervisory power may have a
legitimate jurisprudential basis, most apparently do not. More
serious, some common applications of the supervisory power
doctrine have fostered the impression that federal courts may
appropriately exercise general supervision over federal law enforcement practices. Not only is this perception clearly erroneous, it has led to judicial decisions that, more often than not,
have contributed to the erosion of the search for truth in criminal justice.
B.

The Dubious Legitimacy Of Supervisory Power

If the federal judiciary has any supervisory authority, this authority must have its source either in the Constitution or in an
Act of Congress. However, neither article III nor any other provision of the Constitution expressly authorizes the courts to
oversee the administration of justice in the federal system," and
Congress has never empowered the judiciary to exercise such authority. 7 Thus, if supervisory power does exist, it must be an in5. See GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1050 ("[S]upervisory power has become a
catch-all doctrine on which to base decisions designed to maintain 'civilized standards' of
judicial administration in the federal courts and to update those standards in line with
modern sociological thinking.").
6. In the fourth amendment's warrant clause, the Constitution does authorize some
judicial oversight of the administration of justice by means of searches and seizures, but
this area of authorized supervision is quite narrow and under the warrant clause, the
courts have power only to reject applications for warrants-not to suppress evidence.
7. The various Rules Enabling Acts that have been promulgated by Congress have
permitted legislative rulemaking by the Supreme Court, subject to congressional over-

sight, as opposed to formulation of rules on a case-by-case basis, but those enabling acts
have generally required at least an opportunity for congressional review before the rules
adopted by the Court become effective. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982) (rules of criminal procedure to and including verdict); see also GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at
1051.
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herent or implied aspect of article III judicial power. In fact,
those who have sought to justify the existence of supervisory
power have generally relied on this rationale. 8 However, an examination of the original understanding of the term "judicial
power," buttressed by analysis of the concept of "inherent" judicial authority, suggests that such reliance is not well-founded.
Article III, section 1 of the Constitution, which vests "the judicial power of the United States" in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as Congress chooses to establish, does not
specify what is meant by "judicial power," and nothing in the
remainder of article III or elsewhere in the Constitution gives
precise meaning to this term. Nor do records and discussions
contemporaneous with the drafting and adoption of the Constitution illuminate the matter. 9 Under these circumstances, it has
been argued, it is fair to conclude that the term was meant to
signify the various forms of judicial authority with which the
Framers were familiar.10
The types of judicial authority with which the Framers were
familiar included authority to establish rules of procedure and
evidence. In England, the courts had traditionally formulated
rules to govern the conduct of judicial proceedings," including
rules relating to the kinds of proof that could be offered and the
manner of its presentation.12 In this country, prior to 1789, the
colonial and state courts also developed their own rules to govern the process by which cases were presented and decided."
Thus, it might be supposed that the Framers regarded common
law rulemaking authority as an inherent component of the judicial power provided in article III.' The difficulty with this hypothesis is that it ignores the critical fact that the Framers intended to create a distinctive form of government-one in which
powers were limited and dispersed among the separate branches.
8. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1464.
9. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1466; Martin, Inherent Judicial Power. Flexibility
Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REv. 167, 180
(1979).
10. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1466 n.217; Martin, supra note 9, at 180; Frankfurter
& Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1010, 1017 (1924); GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1052; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1512, 1515 (1969).
11. See Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601 (1926).
12. See Martin, supra note 9, at 181.
13. See id.; Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM.
L. REv. 905, 912 (1976); Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 10, at 1515.
14. See Martin, supra note 9, at 171-72, 182; Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. RV. 1117, 1131-32 (1978).
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Given this overall intent, one cannot simply postulate "a wholesale transfer of powers from the English courts to the federal
judiciary of the United States."'" It is at least equally conceivable that the Framers did not regard the prerogative of formulating rules of judicial procedure as an inherent aspect of article III judicial power, and that they did not intend to follow
English precedent regarding the locus of this authority.
The closest contemporary evidence-legislation enacted by
the first Congresses and early Supreme Court opinions-strongly
suggest that the latter view is more accurate. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 and the Process Act of 1789, which regulated judicial
procedure in some detail," show that Congress viewed the establishment of rules of procedure as a legislative function-one that
might be delegated to the courts in appropriate cases-rather
than inherently and exclusively a judicial function. Early Supreme Court decisions also recognized that the necessary and
proper clause"' authorized Congress to enact rules of judicial
procedure," and that the power of Congress to "ordain and establish" inferior federal courts 9 "carries with it the power to
prescribe and regulate the modes of proceedings for such
courts."2 0 The decision in Wayman v. Southard" is particularly
instructive. There, in upholding a procedural rule adopted by a
federal district court pursuant to a delegation of authority by
Congress, Chief Justice Marshall relied not on the argument
that authority to formulate rules of procedure is an attribute of
judicial power, but on the grounds that the necessary and proper
clause gave Congress the power to regulate judicial procedure,
and that it had validly delegated this power to the courts.2 2
15. GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1053; see also Beale, supra note 4, at 1466
n.217; Hill, supra note 4, at 208; Martin, supra note 9, at 181; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 10, at 1516. One of the powers of English courts which the Framers
certainly did not intend to bestow on federal courts was authority to issue prerogative
writs. See infra note 34.
16. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1467; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 916-17. The argument for legislative supremacy in the rulemaking area is buttressed by the fact that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, apart from the restricted original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, they have no jurisdiction except as conferred by Congress.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
18. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); Bank of United States v.
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825).
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
20. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835).
21. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
22. As one commentator has pointed out, the Chief Justice's serious concern over the
constitutionality of Congress' delegation of its rulemaking power "would appear to make
no sense if one were to assume that the courts already possessed an incidental rulemaking power of their own that the act of Congress merely confirmed." Van Alstyne,
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Taken together, these early actions by Congress and the Supreme Court are inconsistent with the view that the Framers regarded rulemaking authority as either an inherent or an exclusive element of article III judicial power.23 Analysis of the
concept of "inherent" judicial authority supports this historical
conclusion.
The inherent power of a court has been described as that
which is "essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
court as a constitutional tribunal and from the very fact that it
is a court. 2 4 The notion is that courts must have certain powers
if they are to function as courts.2 5 The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the article III grant of judicial power carried
with it such authority as is "necessary to the exercise" of all
other judicial authority, such as the power to punish for contempt.26 However, the Court's contempt decisions suggest that
the concept of inherent judicial authority is quite narrow, encompassing only authority that is indispensable to the exercise
of judicial power and excluding authority that is merely helpful
or beneficial.2 1
Under this narrow view of inherent judicial authority, it is difficult to maintain that federal courts inherently possess general
authority to formulate rules of judicial procedure. Although it
seems clear that courts could not function effectively without
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts:A Comment on the HorizontalEffect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 124-25 (1976).
23. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1467-68; Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 124-25.
24. Dowling, Inherent Power of the Judiciary,21 A.B.A. J. 635, 636 (1935).
25. See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 10, at 1020-22. These indispensable powers
are sometimes referred to as being "inherent" in the constitutional grant of judicial authority, see Martin, supra note 9, at 184, and sometimes as "incidental" or "ancillary" to
the grant of judicial authority, or "implied" from that grant, see Beale, supra note 4, at
1468-69.
26. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see
also Anderson v. Dunn, 17 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) (Federal courts were "universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence,
respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates..
Beale, supra note 4, at 1469; Martin, supra note 9, at 183.
27. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1469; Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 10, at 1022
("As an incident to their being, courts must have the authority 'necessary in a strict
sense' to enable them to go on with their work.") (citation omitted); Van Alstyne, supra
note 22, at 120. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821) (recognizing
inherent congressional power to punish for contempt as an indispensable power to enable
the legislature to perform its duties, but describing this authority as "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed"); Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246-47
(1926) ("A power implied on the ground that it is inherent in the executive, must, according to established principles of constitutional construction, be limited to 'the least
possible power adequate to the end proposed.' ") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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applying some rules of procedure to govern the conduct of their
business, it does not follow that the power to formulate procedural rules is indispensable to the proper exercise of judicial authority.2 8 So long as necessary rules are provided by some authoritative source-e.g., directly by Congress or indirectly by the
example of English and colonial courts-and the rules so provided are compatible with constitutional requirements, there is
no need for courts to formulate such rules, 9 and no basis for
concluding that authority to do so is indispensable to the exercise of article III judicial power.
In fact, legitimate sources of constitutionally acceptable rules
of procedure did exist at the time the federal courts were created and have continued to exist since that time. Beginning with
the passage of the first Judiciary and Process Acts in 1789,
which contained numerous provisions regulating procedure in
the federal courts, and continuing into the 1930s, Congress either established the procedures to be followed by the federal judiciary in criminal cases, directed the federal courts to follow
local procedure and practice regarding matters not covered by
statutory provisions, or authorized the Supreme Court itself to
develop rules of procedure.3 0 Although Congress did not specifically address the rules of evidence to be applied in federal trials,
this omission did not require the formulation of evidentiary
rules pursuant to some sort of inherent judicial power. The
courts could have borrowed rules of evidence from English and
colonial courts, or adopted the rules in force in state courts in
1789.11 In fact, this is what they did in the early years.3 2 And,
28. See Martin, supra note 9, at 182.
29. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1469 n.235. It has been argued that "[tihe power to
make rules of evidence is an indispensable component of the judicial power for if all
evidence law were made outside the courts, evidence rules could be fashioned that would
prevent courts from fulfilling their constitutional function of deciding controversies."
Martin, supra note 9, at 183. One answer to this argument is that "[T]he Anglo-American experience with rulemaking demonstrates no need for the courts to have unfettered
control over procedure through rulemaking." Weinstein, supra note 13, at 923. Another
answer is that rules incompatible -with the courts' discharge of their article III functions
would be unconstitutional. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-47
(1872) (statute forbidding Court of Claims to consider evidence of presidential pardons
for civil war activities is an unconstitutional encroachment on the courts' article III
powers).
30. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1436-40.
31. See id. at 1469 n.235.
32. See Hill, supra note 4, at 208; Martin, supra note 9, at 174. Some years later, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress, when it established the lower federal courts in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, intended those courts to follow then existing state evidentiary
rules. The Court reasoned that "it must have been the intention of Congress to refer [the
new courts] to some known and established rule," and that "the only known rule upon
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although it appears that from time to time the courts indulged
in the common law mode of developing new rules and modifying
old rules on a case-by-case basis, 3 their periodic resort to this
practice does not demonstrate that it was necessary for them to
do so in order to carry out their constitutional responsibilities.
More recently, Congress has adopted Rules Enabling Acts, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil and
criminal procedure. Also, in 1975, Congress adopted, in modified
form, the Federal Rules of Evidence.
To summarize, neither history nor logic provides much support for the proposition that rulemaking authority is an inherent
component of article III judicial power."' Since this proposition
5
is the mainstay of the case for inherent supervisory power,3 it
follows that the legitimacy of supervisory power is dubious to
say the least. Rather than being an inherent attribute of traditional judicial power within the original meaning of the Constitution, the concept of supervisory power appears to have been a
post-constitutional addition, and-as will be seen in the following section-a relatively recent one at that. 6
the subject which can be supposed to have been in the minds of the men who framed
these acts of Congress, was that which was then in force in the respective States, and
which they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in the State courts."
United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 365 (1851). Congress expressly authorized
the Supreme Court to regulate "forms and modes of taking and obtaining evidence" in
1842, but this power went unused and was revoked in 1872, by which time Congress had
begun to prescribe statutory rules of evidence. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. EVIDENCE, § 5001, at 22-23 (1977). Apparently dissatisfied
with the slow pace of legislative reform of outmoded evidentiary rules, the Court, in the
mid-1930s decided that, although Congress had the power to adopt rules of evidence, the
courts could-in the absence of congressional action-reevaluate the common law rules
and modify them to better promote the search for the truth. See Wolfle v. United States,
291 U.S. 7 (1934); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
33. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 32, § 5003, at 45.
34. Even if it could be established that the federal courts inherited some sort of common law rulemaking power from their English ancestors, they could not have inherited
more than the common law courts had to bequeath. Except for the power to issue prerogative writs, see 4 COKE, INsTITUTEs OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND § 74 (1797); GEORGETOWN
Note, supra note 4, at 1055; NORTHWESTERN Comment, supra note 4, at 614, which is not
an apt precedent for the federal courts in this country, see Hill, supra note 4, at 208;
GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1055-56, the legacy of those courts appears to have
been limited to authority to develop rules of a very technical, housekeeping nature, such
as rules governing the filing of pleas and the making up of the record after trial. See
GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1055.
35. Other rationales that have been offered for the existence of supervisory power are
considered infra Part III.A.3, in relation to the question of the legitimacy of supervisory
power as a device for controlling law enforcement activities.
36. See GEORGETOWN Note, supra note 4, at 1056.
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The Origins Of The Supervisory Power Doctrine

The supervisory power doctrine, as it is known today, is commonly regarded as having originated with Justice Frankfurter's
announcement in McNabb v. United States that:
[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions
brought here from the federal courts is not confined to
ascertainment of Constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. Such
standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those
minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason
which are summarized as 'due process of law' and below
which we reach what is really trial by force. 7
In McNabb, the Court employed this self-declared supervisory
power38 to require the exclusion of incriminating statements it
thought had been obtained from the defendants in flagrant disregard of statutory prompt arraignment requirements intended
to check resort to secret interrogation and other "third degree"
practices.3 9 The Court expressly declined to rest its decision on
constitutional grounds,40 and it is clear that the ruling was not a
matter of statutory construction-at least not in any conventional sense-since the Court conceded that "Congress has not
explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured." Nevertheless, the Court reasoned, exclusion was required in order not to
"stultify" congressional policy, as well as to avoid "making the
'
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law."41
In reaching this conclusion, the Court added, it was confining
itself to its "limited function as the court of ultimate review of
the standards formulated and applied by federal courts in the
trial of criminal cases.' 2 It was not, it claimed, "concerned with
37. 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
38. The Court denied that it was creating a new form of judicial authority: "In the
exercise of supervisory authority over the administration of justice in the federal courts,
(citation omitted] this Court has, from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules
of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions." 318 U.S. at 341.
39. Id. at 342-45.
40. Id. at 340.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 347.
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law enforcement practices except insofar as courts themselves
3
become instruments of law enforcement.'
D.

The Nature And Scope Of Supervisory Power

From a judicial perspective, supervisory power has a number
of useful and attractive qualities." To begin with, "oversight" is
essentially an amorphous concept. Unless standards or limits are
imposed to govern its exercise, its meaning can be expanded or
contracted at the will of the overseer. Although, as will be seen
in the discussion below, some such standards and limits do in
fact exist,"5 the Supreme Court's failure clearly to articulate the
source and scope of this form of judicial authority has led to
confusion and has enabled the courts to behave as if they do not.
One aspect of supervisory power that remains unclear is which
courts possess such authority. The McNabb opinion was ambiguous on this question. At one point, the Court appeared to suggest that supervisory power is limited to the Supreme Court,'
but elsewhere the Court indicated that lower federal courts also
have such power.'7 The Court has since endorsed the existence
of supervisory power at the appellate court level, 48 but it is not
43. Id. The McNabb opinion was curious in several respects, apart from its bald assumption of the existence of general oversight authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. First, the Court reached out to decide, sua sponte, an
issue not raised by the defendants. See 318 U.S. at 349 (Reed, J., dissenting). Second,
the Court was mistaken in its belief that the defendants had not been arraigned
promptly. In fact, as demonstrated during the proceedings on remand, the defendants
were taken before a judicial officer and arraigned within a few hours after their arrest.
Accordingly, their confessions were admitted into evidence at a new trial, they were
again convicted, and their convictions were again upheld on appeal. See United States v.
McNabb, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944). Third, the Court also seems to have misconstrued
the purpose of the statutory requirement of prompt arraignment before the nearest judicial officer. That requirement apparently was intended to prevent federal marshals from
increasing their fees by transporting prisoners farther than necessary. See Inbau, The
Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442, 445-48
(1948).
44. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1434; Hill, supra note 4, at 193; HARVARD Note, supra
note 4, at 1166-67.
45. See infra Parts III.B.-C.
46. See McNabb v. United States, 332 U.S. at 340-41 (asserting that the scope of its
reviewing authority included supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts).
47. See id. at 347 (referring to review of "the standards formulated and applied by
federal courts in the trial of criminal cases").
48. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146 (1985) ("[Clourts of appeals have supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation of procedural rules governing the
management of litigation."); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (An appellate
court may exercise supervisory power to require a trial court "to follow procedures
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clear whether judicial supervision is exclusively an appellate
function or whether it is shared by the district courts as well.""
The cases also demonstrate judicial uncertainty concerning the
scope of supervisory power. On the one hand, McNabb and most
other supervisory power decisions claim that the object to be supervised is "the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts."5 On the other hand, there have been aberrant opinions
referring to the Supreme Court's "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement""1 and to a district court's "powers to supervise the law enforcement officials and the United States Attorney within its jurisdiction."5 2
The confusion and absence of definitive guideposts in this
area have enabled some courts to take an expansive view of their
supervisory authority. These courts have felt relatively free to
employ that power to adopt rules that they believe will best promote the ends of justice and sound public policy. In effect, they
have equated supervisory power with discretion to do good.
The courts have also been captivated by the versatility and
flexibility of supervisory power. The doctrine can be applied in
all manner of situations merely by avowing a purpose to enhance
the administration of justice. Moreover, supervisory power
serves nicely as a basis for rulings that the courts might be hesitant to ground on constitutional theory. Since-at least theoretically-supervisory power decisions apply only in federal proceedings,5" they entail no risk of friction between federal and
deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice though in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.").
49. At least two courts of appeals believe that district courts also have supervisory
power. United States v. Premises Known as 603 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir.
1978) (referring to the supervisory power of the district court); Ricks v. United States,
334 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (approving the district court's use of "local supervisory
power").
50. McNabb v. United States, 332 U.S. at 341.
51. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956).
52. United States v. Premises Known as 603 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d at 1302.
53. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o
one, I suppose, would suggest that this Court possesses any general supervisory power
over the state courts."); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 738 (1948) (the McNabb rule
does not apply to trials in state courts); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 340 (contrasting the scope of review of state court convictions, which may only be reversed for
fourteenth amendment violations, with that of federal convictions, which may be upset
in the exercise of supervisory power); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) ("Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension."); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
618 n.8 (1976) (state court cases "provide no occasion for the exercise of our supervisory
power"); cf. Baker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) ("We do not establish procedural
rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution."). Despite such periodic
disclaimers, however, the Court continues to apply Mapp and Miranda to the states,
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state courts. Because such rulings are nonconstitutional, they
are far more amenable to revisibn by the courts or by Congress if
they prove to be impractical or otherwise undesirable. Finally,
supervisory power permits the experimental adoption of more
rigorous standards for federal proceedings than those minimally
required by the Constitution. If the experiment succeeds, the
courts frequently seem to believe, those standards can then be
placed on a constitutional footing and applied to the states.54
These advantages of the supervisory power doctrine have led
to its frequent use for a variety of purposes. Focusing for the
moment on Supreme Court cases,"6 supervisory power decisions
have dealt with such matters as summary contempt," jury selection,57 discovery and disclosure of evidence," acceptance of
guilty pleas, 9 the use of tainted evidence,60 the limits of permis-

even though the rules adopted in those decisions are not constitutionally required and,
therefore, have only a supervisory power foundation at best. See infra Part II.B.2 & n.96.
54. For example, the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings in state cases that due
process was violated by use of the defendant's prior silence, after the receipt of Miranda
warnings, to impeach his exculpatory trial testimony, see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976), and that the "fair cross section" standard is an essential element of the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), were
presaged by supervisory power decisions on these points in Hale v. United States, 422
U.S. 171 (1973) and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
55.

Supervisory power decisions by lower federal courts are discussed infra Part II.C.

56. See Cheff v. Schnakenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (requiring jury trial of a contemnor subject to imprisonment for more than six months); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S.
11 (1954) (district court judge precluded from trying summary contempt of person with
whom he has become personally embroiled in conflict).
57. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion) (regulating voir dire in federal trials to ensure selection of an unbiased jury); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (requiring that federal jurors be selected from a fair
cross section of the community).
58. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (requiring disclosure by the
defendant of a report prepared by a defense witness and referred to in his testimony);
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (requiring the government to disclose reports prepared by its witnesses); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (limiting
the common law privilege not to reveal the identity of government informants).
59. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (vacating a guilty plea because the district court did not personally address the defendant to determine whether
he understood the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea).
60. See Masarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956) (requiring a new trial because
the testimony of a key prosecution witness had subsequently been discredited by his
untruthful testimony in other judicial proceedings).
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sible cross-examination," and-most importantly-out-of-court
misconduct in the acquisition of evidence.6 2
To a considerable degree, these decisions reflect the Court's
concern with the accuracy and fairness of federal judicial proceedings. Certainly, this seems true of the contempt, jury selection, discovery, guilty plea, tainted evidence, and cross-examination cases. In each of these cases, the Court adopted rules that it
believed would enhance the fairness of criminal trials or the reliability of the truthfinding process. But the government misconduct cases are another matter. The avowed purposes of the decisions in McNabb, Rea, and Elkins, for example, were to provide
remedies for recognized rights, to protect the integrity of the
courts, and to deter official misconduct." Whether federal courts
have authority to seek these goals through self-declared supervisory authority is a questionable proposition that is considered in
Part III below. 6 4 Suffice it to observe here that the method chosen to effect these aims-exclusion of relevant and apparently
reliable evidence-runs counter to the goal of ensuring the accuracy and reliability of the truthfinding process. The Supreme
Court has recognized this anomaly and, in two of its more recent
supervisory power decisions, has made it clear that the search
61. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (holding it an abuse of discretion to permit showing on cross-examination that the defendant had claimed his fifth
amendment privilege before the grand jury concerning questions he answered at trial);
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) (holding it improper to cross-examine the
defendant regarding his failure when arrested to offer the exculpatory explanation he
tendered at trial).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (refusing to broaden the
defense of entrapment to encompass "overzealous law enforcement" directed at a predisposed defendant); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (declining to require suppression of evidence obtained by means of surreptitious electronic surveillance); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (overruling the "silver platter" doctrine, which had
permitted federal courts to accept evidence seized illegally by state officers); Rea v.
United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (enjoining federal officer from testifying in a state
trial about evidence that had been seized unlawfully by federal agents and suppressed in
an earlier federal prosecution).
63. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 216-23; Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. at
217; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 333, 345, 346 (1943); United States v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 497, 505 (1983) ("The purposes underlying the use of the supervisory powers
are threefold: to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights . . .to preserve
judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury. . . and finally, as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct." [citations omitted]); cf. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.8 (1980) ("[T]he supervisory power serves the 'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial
integrity.").
64.

See infra Part III.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

for truth is the predominant goal, at least as long as no right of
the defendant has been violated.6 5
II.

USE OF SUPERVISORY POWER TO CONTROL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

Although the Supreme Court claimed in McNabb not to be
"concerned with law enforcement practices except insofar as
courts themselves become instruments of law enforcement,""67
consideration of the forces that led to the McNabb decision
makes it clear that this disclaimer was disingenuous. Skepticism
is also warranted by subsequent decisions in which the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have either used or threatened to
use their supervisory power in ways that are plainly intended to
influence the conduct of law enforcement officials.
A.

The Background Of McNabb

During the two decades immediately preceding the McNabb
decision, the Supreme Court was becoming increasingly aware of
and concerned about the prevalence of a number of disturbing
investigative practices. It was becoming apparent that, in enforcing recently adopted federal laws that criminalized consensual
conduct,6 8 federal agents were relying heavily on intrusive
and-in the view of some observers-potentially unfair investigative techniques such as electronic surveillance and the use of
undercover agents and informants. Also, as a result of the 1931
Wickersham Report, public attention began to focus on the apparently common use by state and local police of abusive tactics
during the interrogation of suspects-illegal detention, relentless
65. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 734 (use of supervisory power "to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude" by excluding relevant evidence seized in violation
of a third party's fourth amendment rights "would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury"); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. at 440 (the Court's
supervisory power to exclude lawfully obtained material evidence must be "sparingly exercised" lest it interfere with the function of a criminal trial-determination of the truth
or falsity of the charges).
66. 318 U.S. at 347. The Court reiterated this disavowal the following year in United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 (1944) ("Our duty in shaping rules of evidence
relates to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used as an indirect
mode of disciplining misconduct.").
67. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1441-43.
68. E.g., the eighteenth amendment, the Mann Act, and the Harrison Narcotics Act.
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questioning, physical brutality, lengthy incommunicado interrogation, and the like.
During the same period, several members of the Supreme
Court-most notably Justices Brandeis and Holmes-were urging the Court to deal forthrightly with misconduct on the part of
federal law enforcement officers by refusing to accept illegally
obtained evidence.69 Until McNabb, however, a majority of the
Court adhered to the common law view that the admissibility of
evidence ordinarily is not dependent on the legality of the means
used to obtain it.70 Thus, in Olmstead v. United States,7 the
Court refused to suppress wiretap evidence because the wiretapping, although "unethical," was held not unconstitutional. The
Court concluded that "without the sanction of congressional enactment, [we cannot] subscribe to the suggestion that the courts
have a discretion to exclude evidence, the admission of which is
not unconstitutional, because unethically secured."7 2 The Court
acknoiledged that it was a question of policy-to be determined
by the legislature-whether evidence should be excluded be73
cause of the means used to obtain it.
The McNabb decision represented a clear repudiation of this
view of limited judicial authority,7 4 and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have confirmed the Court's willingness to intrude upon the prerogatives of the other branches of government
under the guise of reviewing "standards formulated and applied
'75
by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases.
69. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 483-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413,
423-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 477 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70. The Court did not follow the common law rule in cases in which evidence had
been secured through fourth amendment violations, because, at the time, it believed that
exclusion of such evidence was constitutionally mandated. See Weeks v. United States,

232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court has since concluded that exclusion is not constitutionally
required. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
71. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
72. Id. at 468.
73. Id.
74. It is true that in its earlier Nardone opinions, see Nardone v. United States, 302
U.S. 379 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court had excluded evidence obtained directly
and derivatively from telephone conversations that were intercepted in violation of a
federal statute. However, unlike the opinions in those cases, which purported merely to
enforce congressional intent, the McNabb opinion asserted a general authority in the
judiciary to establish "civilized standards of procedure and evidence" for the federal
courts. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
75. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 347.
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B. Post-McNabb Supreme Court Decisions
Since 1943, the Supreme Court has invoked its supervisory
power on numerous occasions, but in only a handful of cases has
it done so to control the conduct of federal investigators. The
few cases in which it has overtly employed supervisory power for
this purpose have involved violations by federal agents of provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to
prompt arraignment 7 e and unlawfully seized evidence.7 On the
other hand, where federal agents did not violate the law or the
defendant's constitutional rights, 78 the Court has refused to exercise its supervisory power to enforce "ideals of governmental
rectitude. ' ' 79 The principal cases reflecting the development of

the Court's views regarding the propriety of employing supervisory power to prevent various kinds of misconduct by federal
investigators are discussed below.
1. Delay in Arraignment
In Upshaw v. United Statess" and Mallory v. United States,"1
the Court employed the general reasoning of McNabb to reverse
theft and rape convictions based on confessions that had been
obtained in violation of the requirement of Rule 5(a), Fed. R.
Crim. P., that an arrested person be taken before the nearest
committing officer "without unnecessary delay." Concluding in
each case that this requirement was intended to protect individual rights, the Court held that effectuation of congressional intent required that the confessions be excluded from evidence.
Neither opinion expressly invoked the Court's supervisory
power, but the references to McNabb, together with the absence
76. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (FED. R. CluM. P. 5(a)); Upshaw
v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
77. See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (FED. R. CRIM. P. 41). The Court
also relied on its supervisory power in abandoning the "silver platter" doctrine in Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), but that case involved an unconstitutional search
and seizure by state rather than federal officers.
78. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (search and seizure); Hampton
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (entrapment); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973) (entrapment); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (use of body recorder; entrapment); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (use of body

recorder).
79. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 734.
80. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
81. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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of any requirement of exclusion under the Constitution or a federal statute or rule, leave little doubt that these were supervisory
power decisions,, masquerading as "statutory construction."
2. Search and Seizure
The Court has also made significant use of its supervisory
power in the fourth amendment area. For example, in Rea v.
2 in an opinion
United States,"
by Justice Douglas, the Court
employed its supervisory power to enjoin a federal narcotics
agent from making available in a state prosecution evidence previously excluded from federal proceedings because the warrant
under which it had been seized was invalid under Rule 41, Fed.
R. Crim. P. Justice Douglas attempted to justify this use of what
he referred to as "our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies,"8 3 by arguing that the Court was merely enforcing the federal rules governing searches and seizures against
those owing obedience to them. Those rules, he said, "prescribe#
standards for law enforcement . . . designed to protect the privacy of the citizen," and "[t]hat policy is defeated if the federal
agent can flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either
in federal or state proceedings."" Four justices dissented, led by
Justice Harlan who observed in part: "So far as I know, this is
the first time it has been suggested that the federal courts share
with the executive branch of the Government responsibility for
supervising law enforcement activities as such." '
Having used a broad conception of supervisory power to
thwart the creation of a reverse "silver platter" doctrine in Rea,
the Court then employed a narrower version of the same authority to overturn the "silver platter" doctrine itself in Elkins v.
United States.86 In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court
held that "evidence obtained by state officers during a search
which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. ' ' 8 7 To justify
this exercise of what he characterized as "the Court's supervi82.
83.
84.

350 U.S. 214 (1956).
Id. at 217 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 217-18.
85. Id. at 218.
86. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
87. Id. at 223.
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sory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts,""8 Justice Stewart made reference to considerations
of deterrence, federalism, and "the imperative of judicial
integrity." '
Subsequent decisions have made it clear that the search and
seizure exclusionary rule itself is a product of the Court's supervisory power, rather than a constitutional requirement as originally suggested by Weeks v. United States,90 and subsequently
reaffirmed in Mapp v.Ohio. 1 Thus, in United States v. Calandra,2 the Court characterized the exclusionary rule as "a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." In United
States v.Janis,as the Court declined to extend the exclusionary
rule to civil tax proceedings on the ground that "[tlhere comes a
point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer
the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in
the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the
Executive and Legislative Branches." Both of these points-the
nonconstitutional status of the exclusionary rule and its supervisory power basis-were recently reaffirmed in United States v.
Leon,94 and INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,95 respectively.s
The relationship between supervisory power and the exclu97
sionary rule was also considered in United States v. Payner.
There, the district court had employed its supervisory power to
exclude evidence of tax fraud obtained by deliberately violating
88. Id. at 216.
89. Id. at 222.
90. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
92. 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
93. 428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976).
94. 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984).
95. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
96. The Miranda rules have undergone a similar metamorphosis. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that the fifth amendment would necessarily be violated if statements were obtained in a custodial interrogation in which the rules announced in that
case, or equally effective alternatives, were not followed. However, the Court has since
rejected the view that compliance with Miranda or equivalent rules is constitutionally
required. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985). As a result, the only conceivable basis for continued application of the Miranda
rules is the Court's supervisory power, yet-even assuming that the Court has such
power-it is clear that the Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over the administration
of justice in state courts. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT

No. 1,The Law of PretrialInterrogation Part II.C.1

(1986) [hereinafter REPORT No. 11, reprintedin 22 U.
note 53.
97. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).

MICH

J.L. REP. 437 (1989); supra
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the fourth amendment rights of a third party, not the defendant.
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed, on
the grounds that this unrestrained use of supervisory power9"
conflicted with the careful balance of interests embodied in the
Court's fourth amendment standing decisions. Pointing out that
"[tihe values assigned to the competing interests do not change
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the
supervisory power rather than the Fourth Amendment," 9 Justice Powell concluded that such an extension of the supervisory
power "amounts to a substitution of individual judgment for the
controlling decisions of this Court."1 00 That approach, he said,
"would enable federal courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application of the exclusionary rule to enforce the
Fourth Amendment,"1 01 "in disregard [of] the considered limita'
tions of the law [they are] charged with enforcing." 102
3.

Electronic Surveillance

The two Nardone decisions'" appear to be the earliest examples of the Supreme Court's use of supervisory power to exclude
illegally obtained evidence.104 At issue in these cases was the ad98. The Court's opinion noted that "[tihe supervisory power is applied with some
caution even when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights," id. at 734-35
(citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), a case in which the Court refused
to exclude evidence tainted by violation of internal IRS regulations concerning the use of
electronic surveillance).
99. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 736. Justice Powell rejected the argument of
three dissenting Justices that the need to protect the integrity of the federal courts alters
the balance of interests under a supervisory power analysis. Agreeing that "supervisory
power serves the 'two-fold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity," he pointed out that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves precisely the
same purposes." Because 'here had been no violation of the defendant's rights, he added,
"the interest in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring [illegal] conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact." Id.
at 735 n.6.
100. Id. at 737.
101. Id. at 733.
102. Id. at 737. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger added: "Orderly government under our system of separation of powers calls for internal self-restraint and
discipline in each Branch; this Court has no general supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch, as it has with respect to the federal courts." Id. at 737.
103. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (Nardone I); 308 U.S. 338 (1939)
(Nardone II).
104. Both Nardone opinions purported to construe congressional intent, and neither
opinion mentioned supervisory power, but Nardone II was subsequently identified as a
supervisory power decision in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943). Assuming that characterization to be correct, it would seem to apply to Nardone I as well.
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missibility of evidence obtained directly and derivatively by
wiretapping in violation of the Communications Act of 1934. In
Nardone I, relying on the plain words of the statute and what it
took to be the desire of Congress to forbid law enforcement
methods "deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and de-'
structive of personal liberty,"' 5 the Court held that testimony
concerning the contents of unlawfully intercepted telephone
conversations was inadmissible. In Nardone II, the Court
reached the same conclusion with respect to evidence derived
from those contents: "To forbid the direct use of methods thus
characterized but to put no curb on their full indirect use would
only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical
standards and destructive of personal liberty.' "106

However, in cases in which the electronic surveillance was not
unlawful, the Court has refused to exercise its supervisory power
to require the exclusion of evidence. Thus, in On Lee v. United
States,10 7 the Court rejected an argument that a narcotics conviction should be reversed because it was based on testimony of
an agent who overheard incriminating post-indictment statements made by the defendant to an old acquaintance who was
cooperating with the government and had been "wired for
sound." Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson held that this
method of acquiring evidence did not violate the fourth amendment or the Federal Communications Act.10 8 Nor, he said, did it
call for exclusion "as a means of disciplining law enforcement
officers," since-unlike the situation in McNabb-"neither agent
nor informer violated any federal law." 109 Under these circumstances, he concluded, there were no reasons of public policy sufficiently strong to warrant a departure from the primary evidentiary criteria of relevancy and trustworthiness. °
Similarly, in Lopez v. United States,"' the Court refused to
use its supervisory power to reverse a bribery conviction based
on lawful recordings of the defendant's conversations with an
IRS agent. In the view of Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority
opinion, "the courts' inherent power to refuse to receive material
evidence is a power that must be sparingly exercised," in order
to permit proper fulfillment of the function of a criminal
105.
106.
107.
108.

302 U.S. at 382-83.
338 U.S. at 340.
343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Id. at 751-54.

109. Id. at 754.
110.
111.

Id. at 755-78.
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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trial-determination of the truth."' Here, Justice Harlan concluded, where there had been no manifestly improper conduct
by federal officials, i.e., no violation of constitutionally protected
rights and no violation of federal statutes or rules of procedure,
application of supervisory power to exclude relevant, competent
evidence "would be wholly improper."11
4.

Entrapment and Similar Conduct

Defendants in federal criminal cases have occasionally argued
that irrefutable proof of their guilt should be disregarded because they would not have acted unlawfully but for improper
11
conduct by government agents. In Sorrells v. United States, 4
the Court accepted this proposition, at least to the extent of recognizing a defense of entrapment where government officials
"implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order
that they may prosecute." 5 The Court has been sharply divided, however, as to both the source and the scope of the
defense.
The majority in Sorrells, claiming to be simply construing the
statute "so as to avoid absurd or glaringly unjust results, foreign
to the legislative purpose,""" adopted a subjective view of en112. Id. at 440. As Justice Harlan put it:
The function of a criminal trial is to seek out and determine the truth or falsity
of the charges brought against the defendant. Proper fulfillment of this function
requires that, constitutional limitations aside, all relevant, competent evidence
be admissible, unless the manner in which it has been obtained-for example, by
violating some statute or rule of procedure-compels the formulation of a rule
excluding its introduction in a federal court.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, dissented. He argued that electronic surveillance violated the spirit if not the letter of the fourth amendment, and that the Court should devise an appropriate prophylactic rule in the exercise
of its "supervisory power over federal law enforcement." Id. at 462 (emphasis supplied).
The majority's suggestion that supervisory power could only be invoked to create an
exclusionary rule of evidence when a specific federal law or rule of procedure was violated was, to him, "a gratuitous attempt to cripple that power." Id.
114. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
115. Id. at 442. Accordingly, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful possession and sale of whiskey because the trial court had refused to submit the issue
of entrapment to the jury despite the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding
that the defendant was a law-abiding citizen who was not predisposed to commit the
offense, but had been lured into it by repeated and persistent solicitation by a revenue
agent. Id. at 441, 452.
116. Id. at 450. "We are unable to conclude," said Chief Justice Hughes, "that it was
the intention of Congress in enacting [the National Prohibition Act] that its processes of
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trapment." In a separate opinion, Justice Roberts criticized the
majority's "strained and unwarranted construction of the statute," and argued that, on the basis of its "inherent right. . . not
to be made an instrument of wrong," the Court should recognize
entrapment as a defense 'whether or not the defendant was
predisposed, in order to "protect itself and the government from
1 18
such prostitution of the criminal law.9
The controversy on these points was renewed in Sherman v.
United States." 9 There, a majority of the Court, led by Chief
Justice Warren, refused to reconsider the Sorrells concept of entrapment and its supposed roots in legislative intent, 2 0 while a
four-member minority, led by Justice Frankfurter, describing
the legislative intent theory as "sheer fiction," argued for recognition of an objective view of entrapment in the exercise of the
Court's "supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of
criminal justice."''

The debate was resumed, and broadened to include constitutional issues, in United States v. Russell,12 2 a case in which a
predisposed defendant had been convicted of illegally manufacturing "speed" with the assistance of an undercover agent who
had supplied an essential ingredient that was difficult to obtain
lawfully. In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, a 5-4 majority of
the Court reinstated the conviction, which had been reversed by
the court of appeals on entrapment and due process grounds.
The most significant aspect of Justice Rehnquist's discussion of
the entrapment issue'" was his reaction to several lower court
detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of
an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission
and to punish them." Id. at 448.
117. The subjective view of entrapment focuses on the state of mind of the defendant, rather than on the conduct of the government and denies him the defense if he was
predisposed to commit the crime charged. Id. at 451.
118. Id. at 456-57. This approach, which focuses on the wrongdoing of the government, has come to be known as the objective view of the entrapment defense. This view
concedes that the defendant has committed the crime in question, but holds that
"[wihatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous infractions of the law,"
he should not be held liable if the government instigated and induced the offense. Id. at
458-59.
119. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Sherman was a narcotics case in which the Court ruled
that, in light of the equivocal nature of the evidence of predisposition, the government's
conduct in importuning the defendant to commit the offense was entrapment as a matter
of law. Id. at 373-76.
120. Id. at 372, 376.
121. Id. at 379, 380.
122. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
123. The Court again refused to reconsider the subjective theory of entrapment and
asserted that it rested on the intent of Congress. Id. at 433, 435.
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decisions that had broadened the entrapment defense to bar
prosecutions because of the government's excessive zeal in aiding the commission of the offense. Disapproving this development, Justice Relinquist declared that the defense of entrapment enunciated in Sorrels and Sherman was not rooted "in any
authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for
what it feels to have been 'overzealous law enforcement,'" and
"was not intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's
foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve. "124 The Court also rejected the defendant's constitutional
argument that the government's involvement in the manufacture
of the drug was so pervasive that his criminal prosecution violated the fundamental principles of due process. Pointing out
that the defendant could have obtained the necessary ingredient
from other sources, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the agent's
contribution of that ingredient to a criminal enterprise already
in process was "scarcely objectionable," much less a law enforcement tactic that could be said to violate "fundamental fairness"
12
or be "shocking to the universal sense of justice. "
The Court's most recent consideration of these issues occurred
in Hampton v. United States, 26 a case in which the government
had supplied the very heroin for the sale of which the defendant
was then prosecuted. However, because the defendant's predisposition to commit the offense was clear, five members of the
Court rejected his claim that the government's conduct
amounted to either entrapment or a violation of due process.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, dismissed
the entrapment issue with the observation that the Court in
Russell had "ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based on governmental misconduct in a case,
such as this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime was established. 1 2 7 Nor was there any due
process violation, said Justice Rehnquist, since the police conduct-undertaken in concert with the defendant-"no more deprived defendant of any right secured to him by the United
States Constitution than did the police conduct in Russell de1 28
prive Russell of any rights.
124. Id. at 435.
125. Id. at 431-32.
126. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
127. Id. at 488-89.
128. Id. at 490-91. Justice Rehnquist added that "[ijf the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not
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In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, Justice
Powell agreed that the government's supplying of contraband to
one later prosecuted for trafficking in contraband did not constitute a per se denial of due process,"2 9 but was unwilling to concede that due process principles or the Court's supervisory
power could never be used to bar conviction of a predisposed
defendant because of outrageous police conduct.1 30 Three dissenting Justices, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, agreed with
Justice Powell that "Russell does not foreclose imposition of a
bar to conviction-based upon our supervisory power or due
process principles-where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to make such a defense might be 'predisposed.' ""3
C.

Lower Court Decisions

Like the Supreme Court, lower federal courts have simply assumed that they possess supervisory power, and have used that
authority to compel adherence to judicially favored standards of
conduct in a variety of situations, including the law enforcement
area.13 2 The most frequent applications of "intermediate supervisory power"'" by the federal courts of appeals have occurred
in cases presenting routine evidentiary " I or procedural questions,M and in cases raising the possibility that false or potentially false statements might impair the integrity of the
truthfinding process.1 36 Less frequent but more troublesome
from an executive branch perspective have been decisions in
in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law." Id. at 490.
129. Id. at 491.
130. Id. at 492-95.
131. Id. at 497.
132. See generally Beale, supra note 4, at 1455-62; Schwartz, supra note 4; CORNELL
Note, supra note 4.
133. See CORNELL Note, supra note 4, at 643 & n.5 (characterizing as "intermediate"
the supervisory power exercised independently by courts of appeals, as distinct from derivative exercises of supervisory power that merely implement the supervisory power rulings of the Supreme Court).
134. See, e.g., Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (recognition of
priest-penitent privilege); Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (special
evidentiary rules for consensual sodomy prosecutions).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 848 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974) (procedure for closing courtroom and restraining publication of potential
prejudicial material during trial).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) (false information presented to obtain a warrant); see also United States v. Di Bernerdo, 552 F. Supp.
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which supervisory power has been used to deal with alleged
prosecutorial misconduct in connection with grand jury proceedings,"I to control the charging discretion of federal prosecutors,13 and to enforce ethical or professional standards against
13 9
attorneys for the government.
Even more questionable are applications of supervisory power
by courts of appeals to control the conduct of federal investigators. Included in this category are decisions requiring investigating agencies to adopt procedures to safeguard discoverable evidence,14 0 decisions requiring the supression of evidence because
of the manner in which it was obtained, " " and decisions reversing convictions because the defendant's presence before the
1315 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (grand jury proceedings considered tainted because government
agent had propensity to lie).
137.

See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983) (conviction re-

versed because of prosecutor's use in grand jury of hearsay, inflammatory language, speculative references, and false testimony); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (perjurious grand jury testimony suppressed
for failure to give target warning).
138. See United States v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 464 U.S.
806 (1983) (indictment dismissed because too complex and unmanageable); see also
United States v. Ottley, 439 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (indictment dismissed on

speedy trial grounds because of failure to join related charges in earlier indictment).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Known as 603 Taylor Ave., 584 F.2d 1297,
1302 (3d Cir. 1978) ("IThe district court under its powers to supervise the law enforcement officials and the United States Attorney within its jurisdiction may require the
return of property held solely as evidence if the government has unreasonably delayed in
bringing a prosecution."); United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967) (conviction reversed because of prosecutor's failure to reveal FBI report favorable to the defendant); see also United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 1974), appeal dismissed sub noma.United States v. Means, 513 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1975) (charges
dismissed after trial ended without verdict, because of pattern of prosecutorial misconduct and bad faith during discovery and at trial).
140. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (threatening sanctions for nondisclosure of evidence resulting from loss of the material unless the government establishes vigorous and systematic procedures to preserve all discoverable evidence gathered during a criminal investigation).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) (excluding evidence obtained by means of search warrant based on affidavit containing false statements); United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Ohio 1977), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727
(1980) (excluding evidence derived from a violation of a third party's fourth amendment
rights); United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1976) (suppressing information
obtained from secretary of defendant's attorney); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 755
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965) (excluding evidence that federal agents had
induced foreign agents to gather improperly); Ricks v. United States, 334 F.2d 964 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (approving district court's use of "local supervisory power" to exclude evidence obtained during police interrogation in the absence of counsel).
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court was secured by unlawful means, 2 or because
government
14
informants were paid on a contingent fee basis. 1
However, the opinions of several appellate courts and individual judges reflect a growing awareness that separation of powers
principles and other limitations restrict the use of supervisory
power to control executive branch activities. The Second Circuit
has recognized, for example, that "the federal judiciary's supervisory power over prosecutorial activities that take place outside
the courthouse is extremely limited, if it exists at all.'

44

And

two members of the D.C. Circuit have declared that "we lack
authority, where no specific constitutional right of the defendant
has been violated, to dismiss indictments as an exercise of supervisory power over the conduct of federal law enforcement
agents."' 4 In addition, Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit has perceptively noted that, in light of Rule 402, Federal Rules of Evidence,14 which makes no exception for the exclusion of evidence
solely pursuant to a supervisory power, "there is doubt as to our
continued7 authority ever to reject any evidence under that
power."14

D.

Summary

The most liberal construction and application of the supervisory power doctrine by the Supreme Court occurred in Rea v.
United States. There, despite McNabb's disclaimer of direct
142. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving use of
supervisory power to dismiss charges against defendant if he could prove that jurisdiction over his person had been obtained by kidnapping him in a foreign country and
torturing him before bringing him to the United States for trial).
143. See United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 800 F. 2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc);
United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, vacated en bane by an equally divided court,
732 F.2d 1533 (5th Cir. 1984); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1952).
144. United States v. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 942 (1983) (refusing to dismiss drug importation and conspiracy charges on the
grounds that government's agents "created the federal nexus which permitted
prosecution").
145. United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg and Robinson,
JJ., concurring in the judgment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983) (declining to reverse
an ABSCAM conviction because of alleged misconduct during the FBI investigation).
146. Rule 402 directs federal courts to admit relevant evidence "except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."
147. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., concurring in refusal to suppress evidence of passport fraud obtained during search by British
officers of defendant's residence in England); see infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of
Rule 402.
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concern with law enforcement practices, Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court asserted and exerted supervisory authority
"over federal law enforcement agencies." Since then, though a
minority of the Court's members have tried to perpetuate the
Rea view, 48 the Court as a whole has taken a more modest approach. None of its supervisory power opinions has actually required the exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of charges since
Elkins in 1960, and its more recent decisions-particularly those
in Lopez, Russell, and Payner-suggest,both in rhetoric and result, a greater awareness of the limitations on this form of judicial authority.
That awareness apparently remains imperfect, however. The
Court has yet to confront explicitly the doctrinal and legislative
restrictions on the use of supervisory power to control law enforcement activities. This failure, which may be due only to the
lack of a suitable opportunity, is perhaps most obvious in search
and seizure cases, where the Court seemingly continues to regard
imposition of an exclusionary rule in response to fourth amendment violations as an appropriate exercise of its supervisory authority. It is disquieting also that five members of the Court in
Hampton were unwilling to eschew the exercise of supervisory
power to prevent the use of lawful investigative techniques
against defendants predisposed to criminal activity.
Lower federal courts have shown a greater tendency than the
Supreme Court to employ supervisory power liberally as an antidote to disfavored investigative practices, not limiting that intervention to cases in which government agents violated the defendant's constitutional rights or otherwise acted unlawfully.
However, some lower courts and judges appear to recognize the
need for cautious application of intermediate supervisory power.
That recognition may spread in the wake of the Supreme
49
that supervisory
Court's warnings in Payner and Hasting1
power is not to be used to upset the careful balance of interests
reflected in its fourth amendment and harmless error decisions.
Even so, the question remains whether there is any sound legal
basis upon which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
148. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 462 (1963) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, referring to "the scope of
supervisory power over federal law enforcement.").
149. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). In Hasting, the Court held that
lower courts may not evade the harmless error doctrine of Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), by using supervisory power to discipline prosecutors for continuing violations of the rule in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibiting comment on a
defendant's failure to take the stand.
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may exercise supervisory power to control federal law enforcement activities. That question will be addressed in the following
section of this Report.

III.

OBJECTIONS TO THE USE OF SUPERVISORY POWER TO
CONTROL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

As has been noted above, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have simply assumed that they possess a kind of
oversight authority with respect to the administration of criminal justice that is sufficiently broad to permit rulings designed to
control the law enforcement activities of the executive branch.
That assumption is not correct. Examination of the theoretical
justifications for the existence of judicial supervisory power, and
reference to the recognized limitations on the exercise of that
authority, make clear that there is no sound jurisprudential basis for the use of supervisory power in this manner.
A.

The Inadequacy Of Theoretical Justifications

As noted above, supervisory power is generally believed to be
an inherent or implied aspect of the judicial authority conferred
by article III of the Constitution. 5 0 Various commentators and
judges have offered several arguments to support the view that
federal courts have such inherent or implied authority. It has
been suggested that supervisory power rulings reflect the courts'
inherent authority to adopt procedural and evidentiary rules for
the conduct of their business,1 51 to fashion remedies for violations of constitutional or statutory rights,8 2 to preserve their
own integrity,15a to check improper conduct by other branches of
government,'" and to create federal common law.155 Some of
150. See supra text accompanying note 8.
151. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 1465-73; Hill, supra note 4, at 194-96; see also
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
152. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 1494-98; HARVARD Note, supra note 4, at 1663;
STANFORD Note, supra note 4, at 442; see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983).
153. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 1494-1501; Hill, supra note 4, at 197-98; see
also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505.
154. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 1510-11; STANFORD Note, supra note 4, at 44345; see also Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956).
155. See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. Rzv. 1, 34-38 (1975).
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these theories may explain some uses of supervisory power, but
none is broad enough to encompass all of the significant supervisory power decisions. More to the point, however, none provides
a sound legal basis for decisions that attempt to control the conduct of federal investigators.
1.

The Rulemaking Theory

The rulemaking theory holds that federal courts possess inherent as well as statutorily granted authority to promulgate
rules of procedure, including evidentiary rules. But even if the
courts do have some rulemaking authority, 1" that authority is
subject to significant limitations concerning the nature of the
rules that the courts may formulate, the manner in which they
may be adopted, and their authoritativeness. 15
In assessing this potential source of supervisory power, it is
important at the outset to distinguish between rules that can
fairly be regarded as procedural and those that appear to be procedural but are so in form only. True procedural rules are those
that regulate technical details and policies intrinsic to the litigation process, in the interest of enhancing the fairness, reliability,
and efficiency of that process."" Falling within this category are
rules relating to the selection of juries, the acceptance of guilty
pleas, and other similar matters as to which, it could be argued,
the judiciary has special competence. In contrast, rules that are
designed to regulate out-of-court behavior, and thereby affect
policies extrinsic to the litigation process, are more properly regarded as substantive than procedural. Such rules, including the
various exclusionary rules, do not guide the judicial process so
much as they regulate the relationship between the government
and the people, limiting the methods that may be used to investigate criminal conduct.15 9 Equally important, they are not
designed to promote the accuracy or efficiency of the judicial
process; indeed, by excluding probative and reliable evidence,
they have precisely the opposite effect. The validity of the
rulemaking theory as a source of supervisory power depends,
therefore, on the nature of the rule in question. The theory may
support supervisory formulation of rules that are truly proce156. The proposition that courts have inherent rulemaking power is dubious at best.
See supra Part I.B.
157. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1464-94.
158. See id. at 1474-75; Hill, supra note 4, at 194-95.
159. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1475-76.
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dural, but not those that regulate primary conduct and, hence,
that are procedural only in a spurious sense. Thus, the theory
does not support the adoption of the exclusionary rules of McNabb, Mallory, Miranda,and Massiah,1 60 or the continued existence of the search and seizure exclusionary rule.
The force of the rulemaking justification is diminished by
other considerations as well. First, to the extent that authority
to regulate judicial procedure can be regarded as an incidental
or ancillary prerogative implied from the article III grant of judicial power, such implied authority exists only when indispensable to the exercise of judicial power, not when its existence
' Thus, implied rulemakwould be merely helpful or beneficial. 61
ing authority does not support the creation of rules to control
the conduct of investigators rather than the conduct of trials.
Second, although Congress has given the Supreme Court statutory authority to promulgate rules of procedure, including rules
of evidence, for use in the trial courts, the legislative scheme indicates that this authority extends only to legislative rulemaking, not to the announcement of general rules in the course of
adjudication.162 Recognition of implicit judicial authority to
adopt new rules on a case-by-case basis would, therefore, undercut the rulemaking process envisioned by Congress in the Rules
Enabling Acts. Moreover, in contrast to the federal district
courts, which have ample statutory authority to adopt common
law rules of procedure and evidence when there is no statute or
Supreme Court rule on point,'" the federal courts of appeals
have no express statutory basis for declaring new procedural
160. We have argued elsewhere that the rule of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964), which mandates exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the "right to
counsel" created in that case, is not constitutionally required. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLicy, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIC, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE' SERIES, REPORT No. 3, The Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel Under the Massiah Line of Cases Part II.B.1 (1986)
(hereinafter REPORT No. 3], reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661 (1989). If that argument is sound, the only possible basis for the Massiah exclusionary rule is supervisory
power.
161.

See Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 110-11; supra text accompanying notes 24-

27.
162. The legislation authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of "pleading,
practice, and procedure" for criminal cases is qualified by the requirement that each
proposed rule must be submitted to Congress and by the provision that no rule becomes
effective until 90 days thereafter. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982). The Court's authority to
establish rules of evidence is even more carefully circumscribed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2076
(1982).
163.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2071;

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 57(b).
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rules for the district courts on a case-by-case basis,'" and the
argument for implied statutory authority is not persuasive."s5
Third, whether the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is
inherent or legislatively granted, its exercise is subject to revision by Congress. Congress has always regarded the establishment of rules of judicial procedure to be a legislative function,' 66
167
and the Supreme Court has consistently endorsed this view.
Consequently, the rulemaking justification for exercising supervisory power lacks persuasiveness to the extent that Congress
preempts or overrules the Court's choices by statute. As the discussion below points out, Congress has significantly curtailed the
Court's freedom to adopt exclusionary rules that have the effect
of regulating federal law enforcement activities.""
2.

The Remedial Authority Theory

The frequently asserted authority of the federal courts to devise remedies for constitutional and statutory violations has also
been invoked to support the existence of supervisory power over
the conduct of federal investigators. Whether such authority actually exists is a question that is beyond the scope of this Report. But, even if it does, it supports the use of supervisory
power only if investigators have acted unlawfully, because only
then is there occasion to provide a remedy. Thus, the courts' remedial authority does not permit the use of supervisory power to
dismiss an indictment or exclude evidence on account of law enforcement practices that the courts find distasteful but that do
not violate any right of the defendant. The Supreme Court has
1"
recognized as much in Lopez, Russell, and Payner."
164. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1479-80. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982) and FED. R. APP. P.
47 merely authorize appellate courts to prescribe rules for the conduct of their own business, and 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982)-the "All Writs Act"-simply expands the scope of
interlocutory appellate review, as opposed to enlarging appellate rulemaking authority.
165. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1481-82.
166. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1465-67; supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
167. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) ("The power of this
Court to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in
the absence of a relevant Act of Congress."); United States v. National City Lines, 334
U.S. 573, 589 (1948) ("Our power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal
courts. . . does not extend to disregarding a validly enacted and applicable statute or
permitting departure from it.").
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 97-102, 111-13, 122-25. In Hampton, however, five members of the Court suggested that supervisory power might be used to re-
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Moreover, even when federal law enforcement agents violate a
defendant's rights, unless the Constitution requires a particular
remedy,17 0 the courts' power to formulate palliatives is limited
by considerations of institutional competence and separation of
powers principles.17 1 To illustrate, a judicially-created rule that
excludes relevant evidence because of a statutory violation, as in
McNabb, carries a substantial social cost in terms of damage to
the truthfinding process at trial and acquittals of defendants
who are unquestionably guilty. Whether those costs are worth
bearing is not a question of law regarding which the courts have
particular competence. Rather, it is a question of legislative
choice that should be resolved by Congress, because the Constitution assigns such decisions to Congress and because Congress
is both politically accountable and in a better position to gather
the facts and to balance the competing values and interests.'"
Now that it is clear that the search and seizure exclusionary rule
is not mandated by the Constitution, the same arguments can be
made regarding the theory that the Supreme Court's remedial
authority justifies the use of supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained through fourth amendment violations.
Another flaw in the remedial authority theory is that it simply
does not apply to judicially created exclusionary rules, because
such rules do not, and are not intended to, remedy antecedent
violations. It is clear, for example, that although loosely called a
"remedy," the fourth amendment exclusionary rule provides no
redress for an unlawful search and seizure; its existence is justified solely by the hope that it may deter fourth amendment violations in the future.17 8 Similarly, the McNabb, Mallory, Miranda, and Massiah exclusionary rules have a predominantly
deterrent purpose and effect, which means that they too cannot
be justified by the remedial authority theory of supervisory
power.
verse a conviction procured by outrageous but not unlawful investigative conduct. See
supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
170. It was once thought, for example, that the search and seizure exclusionary rule is
a constitutionally required remedy for fourth amendment violations. See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Supreme Court
has since repudiated the notion that there is any constitutional basis for this rule. See
supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
171. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1503-06.
172. See id. at 1504-05.
173. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 354
(1974).
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Finally, it must be remembered that the remedial authority of
the courts is ever subject to being modified or superseded by
Congress, so long as a particular remedy is not inextricably
bound up with a constitutional right.17 4 This means that when
Congress establishes conditions for the admission of evidence in
criminal trials, as it has done by statute and rule, 175 the courts
are not free to impose more onerous conditions in the guise of
providing redress for violations of law.
3.

The Judicial Integrity, Executive Excesses, and Federal
Common Law Theories

The claims that supervisory power over law enforcement activity emanates from an inherent authority of the courts to protect their own integrity, or to curb the excesses of the executive
branch, or to create federal common law, are equally tenuous.
According to the judicial integrity theory, the effective functioning of the judicial system requires general public respect for
and acceptance of judicial rulings. This respect is undermined if
the courts ratify illegal behavior by accepting its fruits, so the
argument goes. Therefore, authority to preserve respect for the
courts by excluding illegally obtained evidence is implicit in the
grant of judicial power because it is indispensable to the exercise
17 6
of that power.
There are several problems with this theory. First, even
though maintenance of judicial integrity is indispensable to the
effective functioning of the federal judicial system, it does not
follow that judicial integrity is fatally compromised by the admission of tainted evidence. Indeed, the relatively recent vintage
of exclusionary rules in general, and the present narrow scope of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in particular, demonstrate the contrary-that federal courts need not exclude ille177
gally obtained evidence in order to maintain their integrity.
174. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1498-1500.
175. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (admissibility of confessions); FED. R. EvID. 402 (admissibility of relevant evidence); see also infra Part III.B.-C for a discussion of these
provisions.
176. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1507.
177. It is worth noting in this connection that the Supreme Court seems to have
abandoned the judicial integrity rationale as an independent justification for the search
and seizure exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984)
("Our cases establish that the question whether the use of illegally obtained evidence in
judicial proceedings represents judicial participation in a Fourth Amendment violation
and offends the integrity of the courts 'is essentially the same as the inquiry into
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Second, the judicial integrity theory is plausible only if federal
investigators have violated the law and sought judicial acceptance of the fruits of their illegality. Even then, however, the superior authority of Congress to establish rules of evidence for
federal courts dictates that judicial preferences give way to explicit legislative standards concerning the admissibility of evidence. Third, if federal investigators have not violated the
law-as is true in entrapment and "official misconduct"
cases-there is no threat to judicial integrity sufficiently serious
to even arguably support judicial intrusion upon the prerogatives of a coequal branch of government. 178 In such cases, denying a forum for the trial of federal criminal cases not only conflicts with the federal courts' duty to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred by Congress, it also impedes the enforcement of the
substantive criminal laws enacted by Congress and impairs the
ability of the Executive to discharge its article II function of executing those laws. 179 Finally, a strong case can be made that
public confidence in the integrity of the courts is damaged more
seriously when relevant evidence is thrown out and criminals go
free than when the evidence is admitted even though its origin
may be tainted.18 0
Similar considerations undermine the theory that supervisory
power over federal law enforcement officers can be derived from
the courts' authority in a constitutional system of checks and
balances to put a stop to excessive uses of power by the executive branch. The authority of the courts to curb executive excesses presumes the occurrence of conduct that violates constitutional or statutory requirements. But if neither the Constitution
nor any other federal law has been violated, there is no "excess"
with which the courts may properly concern themselves. In that
event, the imposition of judicially fashioned standards for the
conduct of investigations is but an unwarranted arrogation of
power entrusted by the Constitution to the legislative and executive branches. 81 Moreover, even when the Executive has exwhether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose' ") (quoting United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 459 n.35 (1976)).
178. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1508; see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
435 (1973) (proper regard for the integrity of the judicial branch does not justify a
"chancellor's foot veto" over lawful investigation practices of which the courts do not
approve).
179. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1509-10.
180. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976) ("[I]f applied indiscriminately [the
exclusionary rule] may well have the . . . effect of generating disrespect for the law and
the administration of justice.").
181. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1510-11.
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ceeded its authority by obtaining evidence unlawfully, the courts
must respect the decisions of Congress regarding the consequences unless, of course, the Constitution decrees otherwise.
Accordingly, unless unconstitutional, Congress' determinations
that evidence shall be admissible if it meets certain standards is
binding on the courts, notwithstanding whatever authority they
might claim to have to deny admission in order to check unlawful executive actions.
Finally, there is no basis for crediting the theory that the authority of federal courts to create federal common law provides a
source of supervisory power over law enforcement activities. The
federal judiciary has long claimed authority to formulate interstitial federal common law and has used such authority to create
evidentiary privileges and defenses to criminal liability.1 82 It is
not at all clear from where this authority is derived in the first
place. What is clear, however, is that-as the Supreme Court itself recognizes-this species of judicial power is "subject to the
paramount authority of Congress."1 83 It is also clear that this
power cannot properly be exercised in a manner that interferes
with the constitutional responsibilities of Congress and the President to make and enforce the laws. 8 4 In short, in exerting their
supposed authority to fashion federal common law, the courts
may not disregard the will of Congress or seek to regulate the
conduct of the executive branch.
These limitations belie the existence of authority to formulate
federal common law rules that require the exclusion of relevant
evidence, whether that evidence has been secured illegally or by
means of lawful but judicially disfavored investigative practices.
Since Congress has already determined the circumstances under
which confessions and other relevant evidence shall be admitted
in federal criminal trials, 88 the courts have no power to impose
contrary nonconstitutional rules. In addition, reliance on judicial
authority to create federal common law as a justification for suppression of evidence infringes on the authority of the executive
branch to enforce the law through investigation and prosecution.
Equally suspect is the claim that courts have common law authority to create defenses based on investigative misconduct by
federal officers.'
In the case of traditional defenses, such as
182. See id. at 1511-12.
183. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (quoting New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
184. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1513-14; Schrock & Welsh, supra note 14, at 1126-29.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501; FED. R. EvID 402.
186. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1517-20.
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self-defense, one can at least argue that their recognition by the
courts accords with the presumed intent of Congress, because
they advance the general policy of the substantive criminal law
not to impose liability in the absence of blameworthiness. But
even this questionable mode of analysis does not support judicial recognition of defenses based on official misconduct. In the
first place, the "intent" of Congress that supposedly underlies
the entrapment defense is "wholly fictional."" 7 Second, a defense of official misconduct could not be based on an assumption
that Congress intended to carry forward traditional defenses,
since such a defense was not recognized at common law. Third,
defenses based on police conduct have no necessary relationship
to the culpability of the accused.'" Their primary purpose, it
seems, is to prevent what federal courts deem undesirable, albeit
constitutionally permissible, police behavior. Therefore, recognition of such defenses is objectionable on two grounds. First, it
tends to frustrate rather than foster the policies of the substantive criminal law, an outcome that cannot fairly be regarded as
having been the intent of Congress; second, it invades the authority of the executive branch to enforce the law by methods
that are not so offensive as to violate the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
B. The Effects Of Statutory Restrictions On The Use Of
Supervisory Power
As noted above, the principal limitation on the use of supervisory power to control law enforcement activities is the authority
of Congress to modify or supersede the judiciary's supervisory
power decisions.189 In the four decades since McNabb, Congress
has exercised this authority sparingly, but on two occasions it
187. Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 111, 129-30; see also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (describing the congressional intent
argument as "sheer fiction").
188. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's suggestions to the contrary, a defendant
who is entrapped is not innocent of wrongdoing. Rather, he is a person who has committed all elements of the crime charged, with the requisite state of mind, but is excused
because of wrongdoing by the government. However, it is a mystery why the government's conduct should provide an excuse, since inducement by private persons does not
constitute a defense. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 240
(1976).
189. Other limitations are imposed by separation of powers principles, self-restraint,
and-in cases in the lower federal courts-controlling decisions of the Supreme Court.
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has acted in a manner that clearly restricts the reach of supervisory power to law enforcement practices. These constraints were
created by the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the promulgation of Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 190 Section
3501 clearly bars the use of supervisory power to exclude confessions under the Miranda and McNabb-Mallory cases, and possibly under Massiah as well. Rule 402 has the same effect, and a
good argument can be made that it also prohibits supervisory
power exclusion of tangible evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3501
Section 3501 of Title 18, enacted in 1968, contains two principal provisions relating to the admissibility of self-incriminating
statements in federal criminal trials. The first, subsection (a),
provides that a confession-defined in subsection (e) to include
any self-incriminating statement-"shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The second, subsection (c), provides in relevant part that a person's voluntary confession made
while in custody "shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate . . . if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention."
Subsection (a) of section 3501 was enacted to overcome the
Supreme Court's Miranda decision, which created a code-like
set of rules to govern custodial interrogations and required the
exclusion of confessions-without regard to their voluntariness-if the police did not comply with those rules. 19' Similarly,
subsection (c) was designed to overrule the McNabb-Mallory
line of cases concerning the impact of delay in arraignment on
the admissibility of confessions. 9" It can also be argued that section 3501 governs the admissibility of incriminating statements
obtained in violation of the "right to counsel" created by Massiah v. United States.9 3 This argument, which we have devel190. Congress has also acted to clarify and limit the Supreme Court's supervisory
power decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1982).
191. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1066); REPORT No. 1, supra note 96, Part
II.B.2.
192. See Beale, supra note 4, at 1484.
193. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 22:3 & 4

oped elsewhere, 9' is based on the theory that the Massiah exclusionary rule is not constitutionally required and that the text
and legislative history of section 3501 can reasonably be read to
support the admissibility of post-indictment incriminating statements as well as pre-arraignment confessions.
In short, by enacting section 3501, Congress established the
conditions under which confessions would be admissible in federal criminal trials. It follows that the courts may not exercise
supervisory power to suppress confessions that meet these conditions. It further follows that the exclusionary rules adopted by
investigators in obthe courts to control the conduct of 19federal
5
taining such confessions are invalid.

2. Rule 402, Federal Rules of Evidence
The enactment into law of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
1975 eliminated the authority of federal courts, in the exercise of
supervisory power, to adopt common law rules of evidence "in
More particularly, the
the light of reason and experience."'
promulgation of Rule 402 had the effect of prohibiting the use of
supervisory power to control law enforcement activities by excluding relevant evidence, except in specified situations. Rule
402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States,
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."
Rule 402 plainly requires federal courts to admit relevant evidence unless one of the stated exceptions applies. Under this
standard, it seems clear that courts may not exercise supervisory
194. See REPORT No. 3 supra note 160, Part IV.B.
195. This conclusion is most significant in relation to the Miranda exclusionary rule.
Because the Court has concluded that the Constitution does not require suppression of
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda's requirements, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433 (1974). Section 3501's removal of a supervisory power basis for exclusion leaves the
Miranda exclusionary rule without any jurisprudential foundation whatever.
196. See C. WRIGHr & K GRAHAM, supra note 32, §§ 5191, 5192, 5199, at 173-80, 21926. Prior to 1975, the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal trials was determined
under former FED.R. Cram. P. 26, which codified the Supreme Court's decision in Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). Rule 26 stated that, except as otherwise provided by
act of Congress or the rules themselves, the admissibility of evidence was to be governed
"by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience." For a succinct review of the background and meaning of Rule 402, see Brief for the United States at 19-33, United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (No. 78-1729).
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power to exclude voluntary confessions obtained in violation of
the Miranda rules, nor may they suppress voluntary incriminating statements secured during a delay in arraignment that does
not exceed the six hour grace period provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(c), because no provision of the Constitution or of a statute or statutorily authorized rule provides for exclusion. For the
same reasons, Rule 402 also appears to prohibit supervisory exclusion of voluntary statements produced by post-indictment
in1 97
terrogation in violation of the Massiah "right to counsel.'
Whether Rule 402 also precludes use of supervisory power to
suppress tangible evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is less clear. Although exclusion of such evidence is
not provided for by the Constitution, a federal statute, or the
Rules of Evidence themselves, Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure seems on its face to require exclusion. That
Rule, entitled Motion for Return of Property, provides in relevant part that "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move. . . for the return of the property [seized] on
the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession. . . . If the
motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not
be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial."
In theory, at least, Rule 41(e) seems to preclude an argument
that Rule 402 requires admission of relevant evidence obtained
by means of an unlawful search and seizure. As a practical matter, however, the Rule's exclusionary requirement may have less
significance. Moreover, if Rule 41(e) does significantly restrict
Rule 402's general requirement of admissibility, there exists the
possibility of legislative modification of Rule 41(e).
Considering the text of Rule 41(e), it is not at all clear that
the Rule's suppression provision would have much practical effect if the judicially created exclusionary rule were abolished.
The Rule 41(e) exclusionary requirement comes into play only if
the defendant makes a motion for return of illegally seized property and shows that he is "entitled to lawful possession." Since a
person is not entitled to lawful possession of contraband, the
fruits of crime, or other things criminally possessed, 9 8 the court
may not order such property returned and, therefore, the Rule's
197. The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules indicated that Rule
402 would not require the admission of statements obtained in violation of Massiah,
because the Constitution required their exclusion. See FED. R. EvID. 402 advisory committee notes. However, if-as we argue-Massiah'sexclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, Rule 402 does require the admission of such statements since none of the
other exceptions specified in the rule is applicable.
198. Cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948).
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exclusionary requirement is inapplicable in cases in which contraband or similar material has been seized unlawfully. Moreover, even with respect to non-contraband constituting evidence
of an offense, it can be argued that the defendant is not entitled
to the return of such property until after it has served its evidentiary purpose. If that argument is valid, then the practical
scope of Rule 41(e)'s exclusionary provision is even more narrow.
In any event, legislative modification of Rule 41(e) seems a
distinct possibility. The argument for congressional reform
would be based on the premise that the theoretical foundation
of Rule 41(e)'s exclusionary requirement has been eroded. The
Supreme Court decisions that were codified in Rule 41(e) were
based on the theory that suppression of unlawfully seized evidence was mandated by the fourth amendment. But the Court
has since rejected that view,'" and now concedes that continued
application of the search and seizure exclusionary rule merely
reflects the exercise of supervisory power to deter fourth amendment violations. 2 00 Since the original constitutional foundation
for Rule 41(e)'s exclusionary requirement no longer exists, it is
certainly open to Congress to dispense with the requirement
itself.
That Congress might be inclined to take that step is suggested
by the fact that Rule 41(e)'s exclusionary provision apparently
was never intended to have greater force than the judicially created exclusionary rule. That is to say, Rule 41(e) apparently did
nothing more than codify the Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions and establish the procedure for vindicating the
rights created by those decisions to have illegally seized property
returned and excluded from evidence. This conclusion is supported by the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, which
describe subdivision (e) of Rule 41 as "a restatement of existing
law and practice,"""1 as well as by the Supreme Court's declaration that "Rule 41(e) is 'no broader than the constitutional
rule'" and, consequently, that it "does not constitute a statutory
expansion of the exclusionary rule." 0 11The conclusion is also reinforced by a number of cases in which the Court has created
199. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
200. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 459 (1976).
201. See FED. R. CRn.. P. 41(e) advisory committee notes.
202. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 n.6 (1974) (Rule 41(e) did not relax
the standing requirement of the search and seizure exclusionary rule) (quoting Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969)).
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exceptions to the exclusionary rule without even mentioning
Rule 41(e).103 These decisions would make no sense if Rule 41(e)
independently barred the use of the unlawfully seized evidence
at issue in those cases.
C.

Summary

The use of supervisory power to control federal law enforcement activities by excluding evidence or dismissing charges cannot be justified by any of the theoretical arguments for the existence of supervisory authority, and conflicts with statutory and
other limitations on the exercise of supervisory power. This conclusion seems valid whether the conduct of federal investigators
is lawful or unlawful.
In cases involving lawful investigative conduct, such as those
in which the defendant claims entrapment or similar government "misconduct," the use of supervisory power does not serve
to establish procedures for conducting the business of the courts
efficiently and reliably. Neither does it function to remedy a violation of recognized rights, to preserve the integrity of the
courts, or to check illegal action by the executive branch. All it
does is violate separation of powers principles by creating noncommon-law defenses that impair the ability of the executive
branch to enforce the laws enacted by the legislative branch.
The situation is more complicated in cases involving unlawful
investigative conduct, but the conclusion is much the same. Supervisory power is commonly exercised in such cases to impose
rules requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
law. But exclusionary rules are not the sort of procedural rules
that are within the inherent authority of the courts to promulgate for "housekeeping" or truthfinding purposes. Nor are they
truly remedial. They reflect, simply, the courts' decisions to seek
to preserve judicial integrity and deter unlawful police conduct
at the expense of making all relevant and otherwise admissible
evidence available to the trier of fact. These judicial choices are
objectionable not only because they are unwise as a matter of
policy, but-more fundamentally-because they are choices that
the Constitution has assigned to Congress and because Congress
203.

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not

bar admission of evidence seized unlawfully but in good faith reliance on a warrant subsequently held to be invalid); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (exclusionary
rule does not preclude use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony on cross-examination).
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has expressed its will by enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and
Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM AND IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES

A. The Need For Reform And The Objectives To Be Sought
The executive branch has never mounted a comprehensive attack on the judicial branch's misuse of supervisory power in
cases affecting the conduct of both federal and state law enforcement officials. Such a campaign is needed for two reasons: first,
because the supervisory power doctrine has given currency to
the notion that federal courts may properly exercise oversight
authority with respect to matters allocated by the Constitution
to coordinate branches of government; and, second, because specific applications of supervisory power-those that seek to control investigative conduct by excluding evidence or dismissing
charges-actually frustrate the law enforcement mission of the
executive branch and thwart the truthfinding function of the
criminal justice process. In short, judicial misuse of supervisory
power requires a strong response because it raises both law enforcement and constitutional (separation of powers) issues of
great importance.
The first objective of reform in this area of the law, therefore,
should be generally to correct the mistaken perceptions of some
federal judges concerning the scope of their supervisory authority. They must be persuaded to respect constitutional and statutory barriers to the exercise of supervisory power over law enforcement activities. The second objective of reform should be
more specific-to reverse judicial decisions that rely on supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment or in violation of the Miranda or Massiah
rules, as well as those that use supervisory power as the predicate for dismissing indictments because of "official misconduct"
not amounting to entrapment.0 4 Both of these objectives could
204. Although we doubt that the Court's creation of the entrapment defense can be
justified as a valid exercise of supervisory power, we hesitate to suggest that an effort be
made at this time to abolish the defense, since the defense may have been "legitimated
by four decades of congressional acquiescence." Beale, supra note 4, at 1519 & n.516.
Two alternatives are possible, however. One would be to seek codification of the current
"subjective" view of the defense for the reasons discussed infra note 208 and accompanying text. The other would be to strengthen-administratively or by statute-alternatives
to the entrapment defense, such as rules for undercover operations and mechanisms for
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be pursued through the coordinated application of the following
litigative, legislative, administrative, and educational strategies.
B. Litigative Strategy
The most direct, and probably the most effective, method of
attacking improper uses of supervisory power is to seek through
litigation to establish the proposition that the scope of the judiciary's supervisory authority over the administration of criminal
justice is not broad enough to permit the exclusion of evidence
or the dismissal of charges because of misconduct, or even unlawful conduct, by federal investigators. Since the contrary view
rests largely on Supreme Court decisions, arguments to this effect must ultimately be directed to that court. They should,
however, first be presented to the lower courts, in order to establish a proper record and to generate favorable and possibly influential lower court opinions, and also because cases in the lower
courts may present issues concerning the application of supervisory power in contexts that the Supreme Court has not
considered.
The specific arguments we can make for reversal of supervisory power decisions that attempt to control law enforcement
conduct have been discussed in Part III and need not be detailed here. The principal points to be made with respect to exclusionary rule decisions-those based on Miranda, Massiah, or
fourth amendment violations-are that exclusion of relevant evidence is not a proper exercise of whatever inherent rulemaking
or remedial authority the courts may possess, and that-in any
event-18 U.S.C. § 3501 and Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence preclude such uses of supervisory power 20 8 With redisciplining agents who violate the rules. The existence of effective alternatives could
then be used as an additional argument for abolition of the defense.
205. The Department apparently has never argued to the Supreme Court that section
3501 and Rule 402 generally bar the use of supervisory power to deter Miranda, Massiah, and fourth amendment violations, although we have contended on several occasions
that specific applications of supervisory power by lower federal courts were at odds with
those provisions. See Brief for the United States at 14-23, United States v. Jacobs, 431
U.S. 937 (1977) (No. 76-1193), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (arguing that section
3501 and Rule 402 precluded use of supervisory power to suppress grand jury testimony
because of the prosecutor's failure to give target warning); Brief for the United States at
40-44, United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (No. 76-1309) (arguing that these
provisions prohibited use of supervisory power to exclude tape recordings obtained in
violation of internal IRS regulations); Brief for the United States at 14-34, United States
v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (No. 78-1729) (arguing that Rule 402 barred supervisory
power decision suppressing evidence obtained by violating fourth amendment rights of
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gard to cases involving allegations of "official misconduct" not
amounting to entrapment, we should continue to argue, as we
did successfully in Russell and Hampton, that the supervisory
power doctrine does not give the judiciary a "chancellor's foot
veto" over law enforcement practices that do not violate the
Constitution or a federal statute or rule.
C.

Legislative Strategy

Concurrently with litigative efforts, the Department should
consider proposing legislation that would go beyond section 3501
and Rule 402 in curtailing the courts' ability to use supervisory
power to control law enforcement practices. The most significant
step that Congress could take to this end would be to abolish the
search and seizure exclusionary rule. We have recommended
elsewhere that, for policy reasons, the Department should seek
outright abolition of the rule rather than adoption of a statutory
"good faith" exception.s" We now suggest that the case for complete abolition be buttressed by arguing in Congress that the Supreme Court's supervisory authority 'simply does not empower it
to require the exclusion of evidence because of fourth amendment violations. As a related matter, we suggest that consideration also be given to proposing a legislative modification of the
exclusionary rule component of Rule 41(e).
Another legislative initiative that might be considered is a
statutory proposal designed specifically to reduce the scope of
judicial supervisory power to the adoption of "housekeeping"
procedures or rules designed to facilitate the courts' truth-finding functions. Such a statute could provide, in substance: "The
courts of the United States possess only those powers that are
essential to the performance of their constitutional duties, and
can exercise a wider scope of authority only if Congress has declared such wider authority to be necessary and proper."20 In
essence, a statute along these lines would be a codification of one
aspect of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Its
effect would be to prohibit federal courts from excluding evisomeone other than the defendant). In none of these cases did the Court address the
section 3501 or Rule 402 issues.
206. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DzP'T OF JUSTICE, 'TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE'
SERIES, REPORT No. 2, The Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule Part IV.A. 1 and Conclusions and Recommendations (1986), [hereinafter REPORT No. 2], reprinted in 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989).
207.

Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 111.
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dence on nonconstitutional or nonstatutory grounds, and from
expanding the current scope of the entrapment defense.
A third possibility in this area would be to seek statutory codification of the current judicially recognized defense of entrapment. Such a statute, which could logically be pursued in formulating a revised Criminal Code Reform Act, would have several
benefits. First, it would "freeze" the current "subjective" version
of the defense, thereby foreclosing adoption of the "objective"
view of the defense by a future Supreme Court and removing a
perennial source of litigation. Second, it would prevent judicial
creation of an "official misconduct" defense based on investigative activity that does not constitute entrapment or a violation
of due process. 0 8 Third, it would free the Department's challenge to judicial applications of supervisory authority from the
appearance of being motivated by a desire to curtail or eliminate
the entrapment defense.
D.

Administrative Strategy

Litigative and legislative efforts in this area should be supported by the simultaneous adoption or strengthening of administrative measures designed to prevent and punish unlawful investigative conduct. Effective steps to these ends would
demonstrate that the executive branch is both willing and able
to control its agents. Such a demonstration would, in turn, help
to dispel the erroneous notion that there is a need for the federal
courts to play what the Supreme Court has characterized as "an
undesired and undesirable supervisory role over police officers."2 09 We have previously identified and recommended various measures, ranging from improvements in the training of federal law enforcement officers, to the adoption of guidelines and
other more effective controls on investigative activities, to the
improvement of mechanisms for investigating allegations of unlawful or improper conduct by federal agents and for imposing
appropriate disciplinary sanctions when warranted."' 0
208. This latter objective is particularly compelling in light of the concurring and
dissenting opinions in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495, 497 (1976), in which
five Justices held out the possibility that supervisory power could properly be exercised
to recognize such a defense.
209. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).
210. See REPORT No. 1, supra note 96, Part IV.C; REPORT No. 2, supra note 206, Part
III.C & Part IV.B; REPORT No. 3,supra note 160, Part IV.C.3.
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Educational Strategy

The Attorney General and other Department officials have
been engaged in a "consciousness raising" program aimed at
making Miranda and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
more visible public issues. The Department has also begun to
call attention to the Massiah exclusionary rule and other impediments to the search for truth in criminal justice that have been
relatively obscure to the public. To date, these educational efforts have focused primarily on the ill effects of rules adopted in
Miranda, Weeks, Mapp, and Massiah; less attention has been
paid to the question of the Court's authority to create these
rules, and no mention has been made of the defenses of entrapment and official "misconduct." This emphasis is understandable, since the public may be more apt to appreciate and condemn the unfortunate consequences of decisions in these areas
than it is to understand and agree with what appear to be highly
technical jurisprudential arguments over the proper scope of judicial authority. Nevertheless, we think it would be desirable
and productive to expand the public debate by stressing more
forcefully the fundamental issues of the Court's lack of authority
to impose these exclusionary rules or to recognize these noncommon-law defenses, and the absence of any need for it to do
so in light of actions taken by the executive branch to control its
agents. Emphasis of these matters could generate support for
any legislative initiatives the Department might care to propose,
and could conceivably enhance our litigative efforts as well.
Accordingly, we suggest that consideration be given to making
this Report available to the public; to providing a distillation of
the Report to the press; to preparing an Op Ed piece on the
subject; to including a discussion of supervisory power in Miranda and exclusionary rule speeches by Department officials;
and to having a high-ranking Department official deliver a
speech devoted solely to the issue of misuse of supervisory power
by the courts.
Whichever avenues are taken to deliver the message, it will be
important to stress that the consequence of reining in the courts
will not be unbridled law enforcement activity. This point can
best be made by stressing the constitutional and statutory limitations on the manner in which the executive branch enforces
the law, the administrative steps taken by the Department to
control its agents, the oversight role of Congress, and the ulti-
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mate authority of the judiciary to intervene when the Constitution or a federal statute or rule permit.
CONCLUSION

The use of supervisory power to control law enforcement activities is an illegitimate exercise of judicial authority and frustrates the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice process.
The executive branch should resist more strenuously this incursion upon its prerogatives and the prerogatives of Congress, and
should enlist the support of Congress and the public in this effort. To that end we recommend a concerted response by the
Department along the lines suggested above.

